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Energy-constrained mean field games in wireless networks


​ H. Tembine, Energy-constrained mean field games in wireless networks, Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2014


H. Tembine


mean field stochastic games, antijamming strategies, one-and-half player game




​In this paper, we study anti-jamming problems in energy-aware wireless networks using mean field stochastic games. We consider
three types of users: jammers, primary users and secondary users. When active, each secondary transmitter-receiver uses carrier
sensing and is subject to a long-term energy constraint. We formulate the interaction between primary and large number of secondary
users as a hierarchical mean field game. The proposed mean field framework allows one to describe the evolution of the remaining
energy distribution and the location of the secondary users. We provide explicit optimal strategies for both primary and secondary
users based on attackers strategies. Each secondary user reacts to the aggregative behavior of the others and manages its battery
based on the anticipated complete characterization of the optimal distribution of energy.                


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